Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology
Volume 6

Issue 2

Article 8

2005

The United States Patent Reform Quagmire: A Balanced Proposal
Michael S. Mireles Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst

Recommended Citation
Michael S. Mireles Jr., The United States Patent Reform Quagmire: A Balanced Proposal, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 709 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol6/iss2/8

The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

MIRELES_4-24-05

7/11/2006 6:45:26 PM

Book Review
The United States Patent Reform Quagmire: A
Balanced Proposal
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. By Adam B. Jaffe
& Josh Lerner. 2004. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press. Pp. ix, 236.
Reviewed by Michael S. Mireles, Jr.*
[I]n the space of less than a decade, we converted the
weapon that a patent represents from something like a handgun
or a pocket knife into a bazooka, and then started handing out
the bazookas to pretty much anyone who asked for one . . . . The
result has been a dangerous and expensive arms’ race, which
now undermines rather than fosters the crucial process of
technological innovation (p. 35).
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to
enact a patent law to secure in inventors the right to their
discoveries for a limited time to promote the progress of the
useful arts.1 The Constitution recognizes that in order to
provide an incentive for inventors to create new inventions the
government must create a property right in the intangible
invention;2 thus, federal patent law recognizes a patent holder’s
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a
patented invention.3 Without this property right, it is feared
*
1.
2.
3.

NEED BIO INFORMATION
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
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that there will not be a sufficient incentive for inventors to
invent because the public nature of information goods enables
others to easily free ride on the efforts of the inventor, and thus
the inventor will be unable to recoup her investment in the
development of that invention.4 As such, patent law is a key
driver behind technological innovation in the United States.5
Notwithstanding the understood purpose of patent law, it
is unclear whether United States patent law and policy
actually achieves this purpose, or even if patent law and policy
is necessary to achieve the purported goal of the United States
patent system—to promote the progress of the useful arts.
Some would argue that the government should pay people or
companies to invent or provide prizes to those that invent;
others argue that a first mover advantage coupled with trade
secret protection is a sufficient incentive to innovate.6 Those
arguments are beyond the scope of this review, but are
important to keep in mind as proposals to reform patent law
are considered. This review addresses the former question—
whether United States patent policy effectively provides an
incentive for invention, or perhaps even more critically, is
United States patent policy standing in the way of the its
purported purpose, the progress of useful arts.
The question of patent reform is not new and has been the
recent subject of much debate. Some questions of patent
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1017, 1024-26 (1989).
4. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 8 (2003) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]. The patent system provides another benefit by
increasing the storehouse of public knowledge by requiring a patentee to
provide an enabling disclosure of the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see
also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility.”); JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW
22 (2003). But see generally Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:
Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1315 (2004) (arguing against use of social contract theory as basis for
patent grant and proposing the use of a regulatory theory).
5. See generally John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing
Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002)
(concluding that a theory of heightened patent value due to the increasing
importance of patents explains several trends existing between patents issued
between 1976 and 1978, and 1996 and 1998).
6. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1026-27; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 288 (1977).

MIRELES_4-24-05

2005]

7/11/2006 6:45:26 PM

A BALANCED PROPOSAL

711

reform are driven by the quest for global patent law
harmonization, which raises issues concerning United States
Other
law and policy versus those of other countries.7
questions are driven by whether United States patent policy is
operating at its most efficient level—promoting innovation
while maintaining a rich public domain. Questions concerning
global patent harmonization often raise fundamental issues
about the United States’ concerns with protecting the small
inventor or company—the idealized driver of innovation in the
United States economy. And, as discussed in this review, the
issues concerning protecting small inventors and companies, as
well as related questions of protectionism, loom large.
Another recurring theme in United States patent law and
policy reform debates is the quest for certainty. Inherently,
patent protection itself is uncertain. The very nature of
attempting to reduce the intangible invention into words
describing the boundaries of the patentably distinct material is
immensely difficult and fraught with uncertainty.8 The effort
to then apply the words delineating the scope of the protection
of the intangible back to a tangible accused infringing device or
practice, let alone its equivalent, injects another layer of
uncertainty. Moreover, a body of law, which by definition
attempts to protect the unknown, must be uncertain. Further
compounding the lack of certainty is the very technical nature
of what is being protected—often a new technology which is not
completely understood by those skilled in the art, let alone
judges, attorneys and juries. Finally, the social and economic
values of a patented invention are unclear.
For these reasons, patent reform is currently a very

7. Cf. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002) (arguing that while there have been problems
with each country having its own patent system, the total effect of diversity
leads to advancement in innovation).
8. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd., 535
U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a
series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought
written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. This conversion of
machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be
satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not
exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the
inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but
words for things.
Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl.
1967)).
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popular topic. Critics point to a purported expanding definition
of patent eligible subject matter,9 a weakening of the
enablement requirement,10 the slow death of the experimental
use exception,11 patent law trumping antitrust law,12 and
generally higher rates of patents upheld and infringed at the
appellate level.13 Adding fuel to the fire of reform are clear
examples of inventions that are neither new nor nonobvious as
required by the patent statutes, but which are nonetheless
covered by granted patents and are even being litigated. The
two most notable examples are Smucker’s patent covering the
peanut butter and jelly sandwich14 and Amazon’s one click
patent.15
The most recent questions of patent reform ask whether
patent rights are too strong and too easy to obtain, and thus
impede innovation rather than promote it. For example, a
conundrum of patent law, particularly with more recently
patentable technologies such as software and biotechnology, is
that the patent right may be needed as an incentive to create
the invention, but access to that patented invention may be
needed by others to continue to innovate.16 Finding the most
efficient balance in patent law between invention in the first
instance and access for further innovation is difficult. The
practical answer to the problem is transferring rights, which
generally works well, but avoids, and does not solve, the
balance question.17
9. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System:
A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 305 (2001).
10. See generally Dale L. Carlson, Katarzyna Przychodzen & Petra
Scamborova, Patent Linchpin for the 21st century? – Best mode Revisited, 87 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 89, 94 (2005).
11. See generally Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution
to the Problem Arising From Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347 (2004).
12. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust’s Troubled Relations with
Intellectual Property, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1695 (2003).
13. Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable
Administrative Revocation System for US Patent Law, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1,
9 (1997).
14. U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 21, 1999).
15. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999).
16. See PAUL A. DAVID, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF “OPEN SCIENCE” AND
THE BALANCE BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
IN SCIENTIFIC DATA AND INFORMATION: A PRIMER 9–10 (Stanford Inst. for
Econ.
Policy
Research,
Discussion
Paper
No.
02-30,2003),
at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/02-30.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
17. Empirical evidence of whether patents are impeding innovation and
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Proposals on patent reform have come from many fronts
including the Federal Trade Commission,18 the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),19 and the National
Academy of Sciences.20 In Innovation and Its Discontents: How
Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and
Progress, and What To Do About It, economists Adam Jaffee
and Josh Lerner rely upon over two decades of research
concerning innovation policy to paint a picture of the problem
and offer balanced proposals for reform. Their ambitious
analysis of the problem and their proposals for reform are
thoughtful and beautifully written. While some may disagree
at the margins with the characterization of the problem, as well
as with the proposals for reform, the work advances
understanding of the issues related to United States patent
reform and provides a glimpse into problems associated with
global harmonization efforts.
The authors in an urgent yet cautious voice argue that the
patent system is not functioning properly and has tipped
toward creating and enforcing patent rights that are too strong
and may impede innovation (pp. 34-35). The authors are
cautious because they recognize the importance of the patent
system in promoting innovation (35-51), including the
presumption that patents are valid and must be invalidated by
clear and convincing evidence (pp. 192-95), and that the
strength of the patent right has ebbed and flowed often based
on public opinion (ch. 3).21 The authors trace the patent debate
from monopolies granted by the Queen of England for products
and services that were clearly not new and nonobvious to
whether parties are unable to efficiently transfer rights has been difficult to
collect in the biotechnology industry. See id. at 13–16. The current evidence
indicates that parties are sometimes solving the problem of access through
transferring rights. Id.
18. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
19. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC
PLAN
(2003),
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan03feb2003.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2005).
20. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., A PATENT SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), at
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf (last visited Apr. 10,
2005).
21. See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 899 (2002) (arguing that proposals for dramatic patent law reform should
be viewed with skepticism in light of the history of the reform debate).
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England’s 16th Century patent system that involved a
burdensome and corrupt multi-stage process for obtaining a
patent (pp. 80-90). The authors continue with the 19th
Century reform of the English patent system which drove the
industrial revolution, and the Dutch abolition of their patent
system (pp. 80-90). The authors recognize that the problems of
today are not new and that the process of understanding the
problems and proposing solutions to them should be informed
by the lessons of history (p. 79). Such lessons include the
principle that there are no easy solutions to the problems of
running a patent system because of the inherent trade off
between burdening commerce, competitors, and other inventors
and rewarding inventors (p.79). Also included is the idea that
the process of change in the patent system resembles a
pendulum which all too often swings too far in one direction
thereby creating new problems (p. 79).
The authors argue that the United States, through two
administrative changes, has swung the pendulum to the
direction of patent rights, which are too strong and impede
innovation. First, Congress took funds from the USPTO,
depriving it of much needed resources resulting in poor patent
quality (ch. 5). Second, Congress created the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which has
greatly expanded patentable eligible subject matter and
strengthened the patent right (ch. 4). The combination of the
effect of these two changes—strengthening patent rights and
weakening the standards for granting patents—along with the
effect of such changes manifesting in critically important
industries to the United States economy, has created a “‘perfect
storm,’ a complex and intensifying policy mess rather than a
gently swinging pendulum” (p. 97). The authors’ proposals
provide a multi-step process to ensure better patent quality
through the creation of incentives to allow third parties to
bring information concerning prior art to the USPTO and allow
judges to determine issues concerning validity instead of juries
(ch. 7). This essay will examine and review the authors’
arguments concerning why patent reform is necessary and
their proposals for fixing the problem.
I. JAFFE AND LERNER: WHY DO WE NEED PATENT
REFORM?
The authors argue that patent law reform is necessary
because a primary institutional mechanism to promote
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innovation—the patent system—is likely stifling innovation.
According to the authors, the USPTO is issuing patents that do
not meet the requisite minimal levels of patentability
established by statutory and case law (p. 11). Patents are
granted for innovations that are not novel and/or nonobvious,
that is, the inventions already are in the public domain or
would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the particular art.
Second, patent holders are more likely to bring an infringement
suit based on a questionable patent against a potential
infringer because courts are more likely to find that patent
valid and infringed (pp. 13-16).
Compounding the problem, potential infringers are less
likely to challenge the patent in court because of the cost and
are more likely to take a license, thus diverting resources that
could be used for further innovation (pp. 13-16). Smaller
companies may be unable to innovate because of a crowded
field of patents and true innovators may be threatened with
questionable patents held by companies that are not innovating
(pp. 13-16). Firms may have to raise the price of their products
or services or may even abandon specific research agendas to
develop particular products because of the litigation and
licensing costs associated with developing those products
(pp.16-19). This could mean higher prices for consumers
because of fewer substitutes and fewer products and services to
meet their needs (pp. 40-41). As a result of greater patenting
and the greater likelihood that patents will be enforced, the
innovation process could be stifled because of a web of
uncertain patent rights, threat of litigation, and protracted
licensing negotiations (p. 59). Rather than providing incentives
to promote innovation, the patent system is encouraging
wasteful conduct and is failing to promote innovation (p. 2).
In exploring the cause of these issues, the authors
discussed two pieces of legislation enacted by Congress that do
not directly modify the substantive patent law and appear, at
first blush, to be merely administrative changes: changing the
USPTO into an entity run by fees instead of tax dollars and
creating the CAFC (chs. 4-5).
II. FLEECING THE USPTO
Why is the USPTO issuing patents for inventions that do
not meet the standards that must be met as required by law,
specifically Title 35 of the U.S. Code and binding Supreme
Court and CAFC case law?
The law has not changed
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substantially in the last twenty years—novelty and
nonobviousness are still the gatekeepers to patentability,22 the
guardians of the public domain. The authors argue that
Congress, in the early 1990s, changed the structure of fees
charged by the USPTO and the financing of the USPTO.
Congress treated the USPTO as an entity that is maintained by
the fees it collects from its clients, the patent applicants (p. 11).
As a result of this shift, the USPTO views itself as an
organization whose purpose is to benefit its customers—again,
the patent applicants (p. 11). Patent applicants simply want
one thing, an issued patent (p. 11). Moreover, the shift has
created incentives for the USPTO to process applications
quickly and for the lowest cost, which consequently results in
lower quality issued patents and patents that should not have
been issued in the first place (p. 11). As a result, patent
applicants have an incentive to file patent applications covering
inventions that are likely not new and/or nonobvious (p. 11).
Coupled with an increase in applications because of CAFC
rulings expanding patent eligible subject matter, the examiners
at the USPTO are unable to conduct a meaningful review of
patent applications (p. 20). Accordingly, examiners often will
have an incomplete body of prior art to compare to the asserted
claims in the patent application (pp.139-42).23 Additionally,
the USPTO is particularly bad at performing prior art searches
for new industries because there are few issued patents and the
USPTO does a very poor job of accessing other prior art such as
scientific journals and informal know how (pp. 141-42).
Moreover, instead of allowing the USPTO to keep the fees
it generates, Congress has been siphoning off fees from the
USPTO (p. 20). Empirical evidence appears to support an
argument that weakening patent standards and a rise in the
number of applications has led to an increase in issued patents
and applications for patents (pp. 11-12). The number of patents
granted per year roughly tripled between 1983 and 2002, from
62,000 per year to 177,000 per year, as compared to annual
increases of less than one percent for the years between 1930
and 1982 (pp. 11-12). Moreover, due to the cumulative and
overlapping nature of the process of developing a new product
22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2000).
23. See generally Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better
Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002) (offers proposals to bridge
the information gap between patent examiners and the patent applicant and
her competitors).
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in new technological fields, such as biotechnology and
semiconductors, the problem is compounded as parties may
have to obtain licenses to multiple potentially questionable
patents to develop a product (pp. 59 -68).
Very few would argue that the USPTO has not been fleeced
by Congress, which has resulted in a number of patents of
questionable validity.
Recently, Congress has reacted to
concerns relating to the funding of the USPTO and has passed
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005.24 The Act allows
the USPTO to increase the fees it charges to fund goals of the
USPTO, including hiring a large number of new examiners.25
President Bush’s 2006 budget submitted to Congress provides
for $1.703 billion to operate the Patent and Trademark Office
which allows the “PTO full access to its fee collections in
2006.”26 The question of whether the funding will continue to
flow and will be used wisely remains to be seen.
III. CAFC
The second question presented by Jaffe and Lerner is why
patent owners are more likely to bring an infringement suit,
have their patent upheld by a court, and obtain a large
monetary award for infringement. The authors argue that the
problem has been caused by Congress’ creation in 1982 of a
specialized appellate court, the CAFC (ch. 4).27 The CAFC is
tasked with hearing almost all appeals from the district courts,
24. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat.
2809 (2004). The Act enacted “fee increases averaging 15-20 percent . . . [and]
provides that these fee changes will expire after two years.” Hayden Gregory,
Congress Increases PTO User Fees and Provides Substantial Additional
Funding for the PTO, LEGISLATIVE NEWSLETTER (ABA Section of Intellectual
Prop. Law), Nov. 22, 2004 (email newsletter) (on file with author).
25. John Schoen, US Patent Office Swamped by Backlog, MSNBC NEWS,
Apr. 27, 2004, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788834/ (last visited Mar. 20,
2005).
26. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: FEDERAL
FUNDS
(2005),
available
at
http://www.aipla.org/html/reports/2005/PTO2006Budget.pdf (last visited Apr.
10, 2005); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 75 (2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pdf/budget/commerce.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2005).
27. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035
(2003) (arguing that CAFC is poorly equipped for fact finding which has led to
an institutional design that is inefficient and produces technologically
questionable decisions in individual cases).
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the International Trade Commission, and the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences concerning patents.28 Prior to the
formation of the CAFC, each regional circuit heard appeals
from patent cases filed in district courts in each respective
region (p. 98). The authors assert that the CAFC has made it
easier for applicants to receive patents, patent owners to
enforce their patents, courts to uphold patents as valid, and
patent owners to receive large monetary awards from
infringement, and is thus decidedly pro-patent (ch. 4).
Specifically, the authors argue the CAFC has encouraged the
filing of patents by expanding the scope of patent eligible
subject matter to include business methods, software, and some
biotechnology products and processes; weakening the standards
of novelty and nonobviousness for granting patents; and
improving the enforceability of the patents making those
patents more commercially valuable (pp. 110-25). The authors
cite statistical evidence that demonstrates that in the first four
years of the CAFC’s operation, the patent holder won sixtyeight percent of patent cases (p. 106). The sixty-eight percent
success rate is higher than the success rate that patentees
obtained in the Tenth Circuit, the most pro-patent circuit
under the past system (p. 106). Thus, according to the authors,
the CAFC did not standardize patent practice, but instead
shifted patent practice to be more pro-patent (p. 106). The
authors also point to the fact that “[p]rior to the creation of the
CAFC, about [thirty] percent of the patents were found to be
valid and infringed at the district court level. After the
creation of the CAFC, the percentage of award upheld rose to
over [fifty-five] percent” (p. 106). Moreover, according to the
authors:
Whereas the circuit courts had affirmed [sixty-two] percent of districtcourt findings of patent infringement in the three decades before the
creation of the CAFC, the CAFC in its first eight years affirmed
[ninety] percent of such decisions. On the other hand, when the
district court had found that a patent was invalid or not infringed—
thereby denying the patentee enforcement of the patent—the circuits
had reversed only [twelve] percent of the cases. In the first eight
years of the Federal Circuit, [twenty-eight] percent of these cases
were reversed (pp. 105-06).

The authors then point to a few CAFC decisions and
suggest the implications of those decisions (pp. 110-125). First,
the authors assert that the CAFC has boosted patent holder’s
rights to receive injunctive relieve and damages for past
28. See id. at 1037 n.2 (describing the jurisdictional range of the CAFC).
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infringement (pp. 110-15). The CAFC has increased the ability
to obtain substantial damages with help from the Supreme
Court, by making it easier for awardees to increase their
damages by interest (pp. 110-11).
The CAFC has also
encouraged the use of the lost profits standard instead of the
reasonable royalty standard to determine past damages, and
allowed patentees to receive the sum of damages calculated
from lost profits and reasonable royalty standards (pp. 110-11).
The CAFC has allowed patentees to receive preliminary
injunctions notwithstanding the commercial nature of the harm
because the calculation or payment of damages was uncertain
enough to “render the harm due to infringement essentially
irreversible” (p. 111). According to the authors, the prospect of
huge damage awards and sweeping injunctive relief coupled
with poor patent quality, leads to great pressures on parties to
settle their disputes (p. 114). The problem with this is “the
firm that pays royalties for an invalid patent suffers [and]
receives less of the rewards for its own discovery than it
deserves” (p. 115). As an additional matter,
the firm’s peers may be hurt: had the first firm chosen to fight the
infringement suit, and the patent been struck down as invalid, then
the patent-holder would be unable to pursue others in the industry . .
. . [T]he decision to settle can actually make it harder for others to
challenge the asserted patent, because the patent-holder can use the
fact that the first firm settled as evidence of the validity of the patent
(p. 115).

The authors argue that this raises the cost of introducing
new products, and thus the cost of the entire innovation process
is raised resulting in less innovation (p. 115).29
The authors use the presumption of irreparable harm to
demonstrate that the CAFC has made it easier for patentees to
obtain preliminary injunctions, which demonstrates that the
CAFC is pro-patent (pp. 110-15). The authors do not propose
removing the presumption of irreparable harm.30 This position
can be viewed as consistent with the authors’ positions that the
clear and convincing standard for proving invalidity should be
retained as long as the quality of examination improves (pp.
192-95). Moreover, the determination of whether a preliminary
injunction should issue is a decision made by the judge, which
29. See also Kesan, supra note 23, at 767-68 (outlining six costs to society
because of the issuance of bad patents).
30. See generally Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation:
The “Dubious Preponderance”, 19 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 923 (2004) (criticizing
the FTC’s proposal to change standard to preponderance standard).
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is also consistent with the authors’ general position that judges
make more decisions concerning patent validity.
The
presumption of irreparable harm flows from the determination
by the district court that a clear showing of likelihood of
success on validity and infringement is proven.31 Assuming
patents that are not questionable are issued, the rationale for
the grant of the presumption is a defensible one. The rationale
for the presumption is that the term of the patent is finite,
patent expiration is not suspended during litigation, the
passage of time can cause harm which cannot be remedied, and
the opportunity to practice an invention during a likely lengthy
patent litigation may tempt infringers.32 Moreover, “[t]he
nature of the patent grant thus weighs against holding that
monetary damages will always suffice to make the patentee
whole, for the principal value of a patent is its statutory right
to exclude.”33
Second, the authors assert that the CAFC has expanded
the number of things that can be patented (pp. 115-19). The
authors do note that the tendency towards expansion originates
with the Supreme Court, particularly in the Diamond v.
Chakrabarty34 opinion and the oft mentioned quote that
“anything under the sun that is made by man”35 should be
worthy of patent protection (p. 115).
However, the authors state that the CAFC opened the
doors to the patentability of software too far by allowing the
patenting of a software program run on a generalized
computer, rather than a specialized device (pp. 115-16). The
CAFC made this decision in light of the Supreme Court’s
Diamond v. Diehr36 case, which expanded the patentability to
include a process to cure rubber that relied upon the
application of computer software (p. 116).37 The CAFC cleared
up the issue of whether business methods could be
patentable,38 which led to the patenting of methods that
31. Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
32. H.H Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
33. Id.
34. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
35. Id. at 309.
36. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
37. Id. at 190-93.
38. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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already existed in the public domain or at least were held
secret by third parties. The statutory language of 35 U.S.C. §
10139 is incredibly broad with very few limitations. Although
the CAFC expanded patentable subject matter, it did so after
receiving strong signals from the Supreme Court.
In
particular, the Supreme Court noted the extremely broad
language and clear legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 101.40
The USPTO had a difficult time becoming knowledgeable
about the state of the prior art in the financial industry, which
led to the passage of the American Inventors Protection Act.41
This Act provides an infringement exception for businesses that
utilized business methods prior to the filing of a patent on
those methods.42 The authors’ desire to improve examination
standards does not include the argument that business
methods, biotechnology, or software should not be patentable.
Indeed, the authors note that a distinction should not be made
between types of subject matter, but instead the policy question
should be whether the patent system is encouraging the
development of new products and services (pp. 199-200).
Business methods require the investment of time and money to
develop and may need patent protection to protect against freeriding (pp. 199-200). However, very few will argue against
ensuring that only patents that are novel and nonobvious
should issue.
Third, the CAFC also appears willing to consider patents
non-obvious even in the light of a substantial amount of prior
art (p. 120). Specifically, the authors argue that the CAFC has
placed a greater emphasis on so-called secondary
considerations in determining whether an invention is nonobvious (p. 120). Moreover, the authors point to several cases
upholding patents as non-obvious because of a lack of a
suggestion to combine the prior art references (p. 122). The
authors argue that those decisions “suggest that any patent
application that entails a common sense combination of two
previously well-known ideas must be granted, unless there is
an explicit previous description of the particular combination
that is described in the application” (pp. 122-23). The authors
39. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
40. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 181.
41. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub.L. 106-113, Div. B, §
1000(a)(9) [Title IV (§§ 4001 to 4808)], 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-552 (codified at
various sections of 35 U.S.C. (2000)).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000).
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do not advocate for an elimination of the use of “secondary
considerations” or the “suggestion or motivation to combine”
test. The use of the “suggestion or motivation to combine” test
is designed to prevent the use of hindsight construction in
determining patentability.43 In other words, almost anything is
obvious after someone shows it to you—arguably that is just a
part of human nature. The “suggestion or motivation to
combine” test attempts to inject certainty, understandability,
and applicability into suits determined by judges and juries.44
Generally, suggestion or motivation does not have to explicitly
appear in a prior art reference, but also can be derived from the
knowledge of those skilled in the art, including an Examiner’s
personal knowledge.45 Recent Federal Circuit cases have,
however, required that the knowledge of those skilled in the art
must be somehow explicitly noted (pp. 122-23). This makes
sense because an accused infringer could merely pay an expert
willing to state that a suggestion or motivation is present in the
knowledge of those skilled in the art, and the question would
degenerate into a credibility assessment.
Finally, the CAFC is increasingly relying upon juries in
patent cases (p. 123). According to the authors, the use of
juries in patent cases was historically rare because of judicial
skepticism that juries could understand complex technical,
legal, and business issues and the difficulty of appellate review
of the unexpressed reasoning of juries versus having the
reasoning of a district court judge expressed in an order (p.
124). Additionally, and importantly, many patent attorneys
believe juries are too sympathetic to patent holders (p. 124).
Indeed, one study found that in 299 cases between 1989 and
1996, juries found patents to be valid over two-thirds of the
time (p. 125). In contrast, when judges ruled the patent holder
was upheld less than forty-seven percent of the time (p. 125).
Another study found that between 1999 and 2000, juries were

43. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
44. Id.
45. Id.; In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies, C.J.,
concurring) (“Such suggestion or motivation to combine prior art teachings can
derive solely from the existence of a teaching, which one of ordinary skill in
the art would be presumed to know, and the use of that teaching to solve the
same or similar problem which it addresses.”); see also PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2145(X)(A) (8th ed.
2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2005).
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two times as likely to uphold patents as were judges (p. 125).46
Jaffe and Lerner’s proposed solutions to the asserted
problems do not go so far as to advocate for abolition of the
CAFC.
First, notwithstanding the effect of purported
undesirable and unintended consequences flowing from its
decisions, it is important to note that the CAFC was created for
a good reason. Second, the CAFC is fulfilling its purpose of
creating a uniform body of patent law.47 Third, the CAFC has
issued many opinions that attempt to limit the scope of patents,
and several doctrines operate to curb the enforcement of
dubious patents.
The CAFC was created at a time when the United States
was very concerned about its competitive position compared
with Japan. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United
States was no longer viewed as an innovator. Some believed
that part of the problem with the United States’ overall
innovation process was the uncertainty in the enforceability of
patents.48 District court and appellate court judges, when
confronted with patents, often viewed the patent as an
impermissible monopoly and would find the patent invalid or
construe the claims so narrowly there could be no
infringement.49 Each regional circuit in the United States
developed its own patent law with some circuits exhibiting
more patent-friendly behavior than others.
The story is told of then-Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Thurgood Marshall when he was visiting senators in
preparation for his confirmation hearing as President
Johnson’s nominee to the Supreme Court. One well-known
senator asked Judge Marshall what his views were on patents.
The Judge reportedly responded, “I haven’t given patents much
thought, Senator, because I’m from the Second Circuit and as
46. See also Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 874 (2002).
47. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empircal Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1105, 1174 (2004) (stating that, while the CAFC has not been an
unqualified success, it is moving in the right direction). For updated evidence,
A
RESEARCH
PROJECT
ON
THE
see
CLAIMCONSTRUCTION.COM:
INTERPRETATION OF PATENT LANGUAGE, at www.claimconstruction.com (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005).
48. See The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of The United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, 84 F.R.D. 429, 471-75 (May 9, 1979)
(comments of Robert Benson).
49. See Simone A. Rose, Patent “Monopolyphobia”: A Means of
Extinguishing the Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 527 (1999).
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you know we don’t uphold patents in the Second Circuit.”50
Thus, simply filing a declaratory judgment action of
noninfringement or invalidity practically guaranteed victory in
the case. For example, between 1953-1977, patents were found
valid and infringed on appeal in less than ten percent of the
cases heard in the Eighth Circuit (p. 100). In the Tenth
Circuit, this number was almost sixty percent (p. 100). Thus
forum shopping led to a system where the validity,
enforceability and scope of patents were always in question.
This degree of uncertainty fails to provide incentives to invent.
Inventors and capitalists were unsure of whether to invest in
the research and development of a particular product or even
bear the costs of prosecuting a patent because it was unclear
whether they will recoup the money invested in creation of that
product.
The CAFC has, by its very formation, created greater
certainty in the patent law.51 While some may disagree with
the outcomes of its decisions, the benefit of having one
appellate court interpret and apply patent law is much more
desirable than twelve courts with different positions. This is
particularly true because the Supreme Court rarely grants a
writ of certiorari on a patent case.52 Furthermore, CAFC
decisions concerning claim construction have increased the
certainty associated with that art. The anticipated en banc
decision of the CAFC, Phillips v. AWH,53 will provide additional
guidance in claim construction. Moreover, the CAFC, in a
quest for more certainty, attempted to reign in the doctrine of
equivalents in the Festo case.54 However, the Supreme Court
50. Hon. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The Creation of the Federal Circuit, in
DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 29-30 (1998).
51. See id. at 30; see also Prepared Remarks of James E. Rogan, Under
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, at the Hearings on Competition and
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Feb.
6, 2002), available at www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/rogan.htm (last visited Feb. 25
2005). Rogan stated that one of the developments in the last 20 years that has
affected patent policy was “the establishment of the [CAFC]. The existence of
a court of national jurisdiction for cases involving patents has been an
invaluable tool. By reducing jurisdictional conflicts that had preceded the
court’s formation, the [CAFC] has made for a more stable patent system.” Id.
52. See Jared Goff, The Unpredictable Scope of the Waiver Resulting from
the Advice-of-Counsel Defense to Willful Patent Infringement, 1998 BYU L.
REV. 213, 216 (1998).
53. 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting en banc rehearing).
54. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
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curtailed the effect of the CAFC’s attempt to limit the scope of
patents with prosecution history estoppel.55 The CAFC has
also limited the strength of patents with other doctrines,
including the disclosure dedication rule of Johnson and
Johnston Associates v. R.E. Service Co.56 and the prosecution
laches doctrine of Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson
Medical, Education & Research Foundation, Ltd.57 However,
according to the decision in Independent Service Organizations
Antitrust Ligigation v. Xerox,58 and much to the ire of the
antitrust bar, the CAFC has apparently favored patents over
the antitrust law in allowing the patentee the right to a
unilateral refusal to sell or license without an inquiry into
subjective motivation.59 Notably, in the refusal to deal context,
a patentee may be subject to antitrust liability and treble
damages if (1) the patentee’s acquisition of the litigated patents
involved willful fraud on the Patent Office,60 or (2) the
patentee’s infringement cause of action was a “mere sham to
cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”61 The
Xerox decision may have led to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,62
which created uncertainty by allowing patent counterclaims to
be heard in regional circuits instead of the CAFC.
Commentators have made several proposals to change the
result of the Vornado decision and the inconsistency it
creates.63 A recent CAFC case provides some deference to the
antitrust law by holding that there is a presumption of market

727-28 (2002).
55. Id. at 732.
56. 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that which is disclosed,
but not claimed, is dedicated to the public domain).
57. 277 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
58. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
59. See id.
60. Id. at 1326 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)).
61. Id. (citing E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
62. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
63. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under" Jurisdiction
and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003);
Elizabeth I. Rogers, The Phoenix Precedents: The Unexpected Rebirth of
Regional Circuit Jurisdiction Over Patent Appeals and the Need For a
Considered Congressional Response, 16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 411 (2003).
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power in a patent.64 Finally, it is important to note that the
defense of inequitable conduct that renders a patent
unenforceable may deter undesired conduct, such as an
attempt to enforce dubious patents.
IV. JAFFE AND LERNER: IT IS BROKEN—HOW DO WE
FIX IT?
A. PROBLEMS WITH PATENT REFORM
A clear “fix” to the patent system is a meaningful pre-grant
opposition system that allows third parties to produce relevant
prior art without penalizing the third party in later litigation.65
Instead,
we
have
a
reexamination
system
that,
notwithstanding several updates, is rendered ineffective by a
limited number of issues covered in the reexamination process,
ambiguities surrounding the litigation process, the prominent
role given to examiners in reviewing their own work, and the
fact that if you initiate the inter partes reexamination process
and fail, your ability to challenge the patent in court are
greatly restricted (p. 155). The relatively new inter partes
reexamination procedure was only used six times in the first
three years the procedure was available (p. 155). Why don’t we
have a meaningful pre-grant opposition system? The authors
assert that the reason is unreasonable concern with harming
small firms (pp. 156-57). First, applicants would not be able to
rely on trade secret law if their applications are published.
Second, large firms may harass small firms by frequently
opposing their patent applications, which can make it difficult
for small firms to build their patent portfolios.66 These
arguments, according to the authors, are flawed and have been
used by commentators such as Oliver North and G. Gordon
Liddy to derail any meaningful reform (p. 157).
The authors rely on a body of work called “political
64. See generally Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396
F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
65. See generally Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in
Administrative Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition and
Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63 (1998).
66. But see Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent
Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1300 (2003)
(reporting that over 40% of interferences are filed by the party that is first to
invent and last to file, but small inventors are not particularly benefiting from
the first to invent system).
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economy,” which emphasizes the danger of “capture” of
government programs to explain why patent reform is not
happening (p. 160).
The theory of regulatory capture suggests that groups who have three
shared characteristics will capture and control programs that create
economic benefits: They stand to gain substantial benefits[;] [t]heir
collective political activity is not too difficult to arrange[;] [and] [t]he
parties who are most affected by their actions are highly dispersed
and find it difficult to organize (p.160).

According to the authors, several characteristics of the
patent system that make capture likely are the complexity of
the laws; the negative effects of bad patent policy are diffuse
and difficult to see and understand; the policy debate
concerning the “small inventor”; and lack of a common
language between practitioners and scholars (pp. 160-61).
Moreover, the patent bar has proven to be a powerful lobby
advocating against change; small capital-constrained firms do
not have the resources for lobbying efforts; the adverse
consequences of a poorly functioning patent system are diffuse
and indirect; and finally, the ultimate party harmed, the
consumer, does not understand the adverse consequences of
more expensive products due to litigation and royalties, and
products that were either not brought to market or delayed in
being brought to market (pp. 168-69).
Having identified the problems with the current patent
system, the authors focus their proposals for reform on the ease
of obtaining a patent at the USPTO and the likelihood of
success in enforcing a patent in the courts (pp. 170-71). The
authors begin their analysis by setting forth the conceptual
framework and basis of their proposals (pp. 170-71). First, the
authors set out three generally agreed upon goals for the
patent system. These include: (a) improving patent quality by
ensuring that only inventions that are truly novel and
nonobvious are patented, that the patent procurement process
is quick and reliable, and that the patents that are issued
provide an adequate property right to protect investment in the
invention; (b) reducing uncertainty, which includes the
uncertainty that innovators have that an unknown or untested
patent will be asserted against them; and (c) keeping costs
under control (pp. 171-172). Second, the authors assert that
there are some very basic truths about patent reform.
According to the authors, patent examination will never be
perfect. Better examination will require more resources, and
since most patents are worthless and unimportant, throwing
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more money at the examination process is generally not
helpful.
In spite of this truth, the authors disagree with Mark
Lemley’s “rational ignorance” theory, which posits that society
is rationally choosing to remain ignorant about which patents
should be granted and that it is reasonably efficient to accept
poor examination quality and let courts sort out the validity of
the patents that truly matter (p. 174).67 Instead, the authors
believe that the current patent system is not working in an
acceptably efficient manner (p. 175). In particular, they believe
the intangible cost of low quality patents does not just include
the cost of litigation, but also includes uncertainty created by
overlapping dubious patents which reduces the incentive to
invest in innovation (p. 175). Moreover, the loss of products
and services that never make it to market because of an
abandoned development due to threatened litigation or
licensing costs is high (p. 175).68
In addition, issuing bad patents encourages bad
applications to be filed. Potential litigants also respond to how
courts behave, that is if courts make it easier to enforce
patents, litigants will file more law suits. There is also a need
for a strong incentive to get more information to the PTO to
prevent the issuance of patents that would not have issued if
that information was before the PTO.69 And finally, an
improved recalibration of the system can be achieved with “a
better balance between rapid approval of good applications and
67. See also Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In
Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219
(2004) (criticizing rational ignorance theory); John R. Thomas, The
Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727 (2002) (criticizing
rational ignorance theory). For a discussion of the theory see Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001).
68. See generally Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office
Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 943 (2004) (arguing that litigation is an poor substitute for
adequate patent examination at the USPTO and suggest better funding for
the USPTO, higher standards for initial review, better incentives for
applicants to find and disclose prior art information, and the creation of a
cheap and workable administrative post-issue review).
69. The authors recognize that providing an opportunity for competitors
to present information to defeat a patent can “gum up the works” (p. 177).
Competitors will be opportunistic and attempt to delay a potentially valid
patent and that will increase the cost, uncertainty, and delay for valid patent
applications (p. 177).
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reliable rejection of bad ones, and do it without dramatically
increased resources” by paying attention to the incentives that
different reforms create for desirable and undesirable behavior
(p. 178).
B. MULTIPLE-TIERED SYSTEM OF REVIEWING PATENTS
To balance the need to bring in more information with the
fact that most patents are unimportant, the authors propose a
multi-tiered system of reviewing patents and patent
applications (pp. 179-81).
Accordingly, patents that are
unimportant and unlikely to be the subject of litigation would
receive the current examination practice (p. 181). For the more
important patents, parties would have an incentive and
opportunities to bring information to the USPTO, and the
USPTO would at least be able to make an informed, if not
always the correct, decision of validity on patents (p. 181).
First, the application process would proceed as it currently
operates; the applicant files their application and the examiner
reviews it (p. 180). Second, prior to issuance of the patent, a
public notice of the intention to issue the patent would be
followed by an opportunity in which third parties could submit
relevant prior art (p. 180). This “pre-grant opposition” would
only allow the submission of prior art and does not give a third
party the opportunity to argue their case or use legal discovery
to produce additional evidence of prior art (p. 180). Third,
assuming the patent issues, there is an opportunity to file a
request for a reexamination (p. 180). The request must have a
stated basis, and the request may be denied by the USPTO (p.
180). If allowed, an independent examiner would undertake
the reexamination with the opportunity for third parties to
make arguments regarding patentability (p. 180).
C. THE PRE-GRANT OPPOSITION PROCEEDING
The pre-grant opposition proceeding, similar to the
trademark opposition procedure, allows parties an opportunity
to present relevant information to the Patent Office. The
current patent system does not provide any meaningful
opportunity for third parties to provide information to the
USPTO (p. 182). For example, under USPTO rules, a third
party can protest a filed, but unpublished application by
arguing grounds related to patentability. However, the protest
has to be filed before the application is published by the
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USPTO.70 Thus, third parties must submit an argument that
the patent is invalid without knowing what invention is
claimed in the patent application, unless they somehow
independently obtain this information—perhaps through trade
secret misappropriation (p. 182).
Moreover, the limited
proposal by the authors merely allows the opportunity to
present information—not gum up the system with legal
argument and posturing (p. 182). The most important tactical
concern is what will be the legal effect of providing prior art to
the examiner if the examiner decides to issue the patent
notwithstanding the prior art. More succinctly, how does this
affect the issue of legal validity of the patent in a future forum?
Generally, new prior art not before the examiner during
examination is very persuasive evidence of the invalidity of the
patent in court (p. 182). Moreover, the decision of the court is
closer to a final decision than an administrative decision of the
USPTO. Most litigation attorneys and patent prosecutors will
likely counsel against using a pre-grant opposition if there is
the danger of a legal presumption that the patent is valid in
light of that prior art. The authors argue that there should be
no legal presumption regarding the validity of the patent over
the art provided by the outside party, thus there should not be
a concern over “wasting good stuff” on an examiner (p. 183).
This, however, does not give any deference to the decision of the
examiner. The authors argue this is warranted because the
third party has not had the opportunity to make any express
arguments (p. 183).
D. THE POST-GRANT THIRD PARTY REEXAMINATION
The second prong of the authors’ approach to improve the
quality of issued patents is the opportunity for a meaningful
third party reexamination (p. 184).71 This meaningful third
70. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE, supra note 45, § 1901.04.
71. See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a
Viable Administrative Revocation System for US Patent Law, 11 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 1 (1997) (proposing adoption of a model based on the U.S. trademark
system inter partes administration procedures or the European Patent
Convention post-grant opposition practice); see also Bronwyn H. Hall &
Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the US Patent System—Design
Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989 (2004) (The article
discusses how U.S. patent quality has been deteriorating and “reviewing the
impact of post-grant review mechanisms as advocated by the policy review
boards.”).
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party reexamination is balanced against a desire to ensure that
competitors are not strategically using the process to delay or
obstruct the granting of a patent (p. 184). The meaningful
third party examination also ensures that resources are only
expended on a few patents and that there is an opportunity for
outside information to be brought to the USPTO’s attention (p.
184). According to the authors, the current reexamination
system’s rules are tipped too far toward protecting against
strategic use of the system to delay the granting of the patent
(p. 187). Some of those rules include: a right to appeal if the reexamination results in a withdrawn patent grant, but not if the
patent is not withdrawn; the party initiating the reexamination
is prohibited from making any argument concerning validity
that could have been made in the reexamination in a future
litigation; and the only evidence concerning validity that can be
produced are patents and printed publications (p. 187). The
authors argue that in order to ensure that there are proper
incentives to bring information to the USPTO and prohibit
strategic use designed to delay a patent grant, the following
proposals should be adopted: third parties should be able to
bring forth any factual evidence and not be limited to patents
and printed publications; parties should only be barred from
making specific arguments made to the USPTO during the
reexamination in future litigation; reexaminations should be
only conducted by a group of reexaminers; and the patentee
and challenger should have the right to appeal the USPTO’s
decision (p. 188). Finally, the authors assert that there should
be a “non-trivial” fee, such as $50,000, to initiate a
reexamination, and that if the challenge is successful, the
patent applicant should pay that fee along with the challenger’s
legal fees (pp. 188-89). If the challenge is not successful, the
authors argue that the challenger should reimburse the
applicant’s costs of defending the patent (p. 189).
The proposed fee structure would likely impact small
inventors and companies unable to pay that amount when
presented with a challenge. The $50,000 fee coupled with the
prospect of paying your own as well as the opponent’s legal fees
is a tremendous burden which may serve to provide a
disincentive to pursue a patent or abandon a patent. This in
turn could lead to less investment in innovation as firms are
unable to obtain reimbursement for their research and
development costs.
Indeed, the authors admit that “the
knowledge that this expensive and unattractive prospect likely
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lies at the end of the road will discourage marginal applicants
from filing patent applications in the first place” (p. 189).
Finding the appropriate amount of cost to initiate the
reexamination while providing the proper incentives and
disincentives is also particularly difficult because of the
difference in value or potential value of different types of
innovations such as pharmaceuticals. The prospect of delaying
the issuance of a patent on a pharmaceutical that serves as a
substitute to another pharmaceutical that is covered by a
patent could mean millions of dollars in market share for a
period of time. The fee structure may need to be staggered for
different types of innovations and perhaps small inventors or
companies could be excluded from operation of the legal fees
provision making the loser bear the winner’s fees.
Finally, the authors also add that the initial examination
should be improved through a rethinking of the goals of the
USPTO and the definition of productivity along with additional
funding necessary to hire, retain, and train examiners and
update its information systems (p. 191). Unquestionably, these
reforms would improve the quality of reexamination.
E. JUDGES INSTEAD OF JURIES
The second prong of analysis presented by the authors
includes addressing the CAFC’s unbalanced attitude toward
protecting patent rights.
First, the authors attack the
presumption of validity accorded to patents which dictates that
the challenger must prove the invalidity of patent by clear and
convincing evidence (p. 192). The logic underpinning this rule
is that the decision making accorded to administrative bodies
should be given some weight (p. 193). However, given the
authors’ prior arguments concerning the poor quality of issued
patents and the “Rational Ignorance principal,” the authors
assert that there is a strong argument for eradicating the
presumption (p. 193). However, the authors do not push the
argument that far and recognize the patent grant must be
worth something otherwise investors would not invest in new
technologies because the there would not be even a nominal
guarantee that they would be able to recoup their investment
in the technology and the procurement of the patent (pp. 19394).
As a result, the authors argue that keeping the
presumption intact is prudent if their prior proposals
concerning pre-grant oppositions and reexamination are
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adopted (p. 194).72 The presumption will carry more meaning
when examiners have relevant prior art to consider during
examination and third parties will have had the meaningful
opportunity to challenge the patent (p. 194).
Second, the authors assert that difficult technical evidence
along with the clear and convincing burden of proof standard
makes it likely that a jury will be more likely to find in favor of
a patentee (pp. 195-96). The common argument in defense of
jurors is that it is fair to be judged by your peers instead of a
judge, a principle of Anglo-American law (p. 196). However,
this concept bears less weight because a jury of a patentee’s
peers is likely other scientists, engineers, or experienced
members of a particular business, not your member of the
general public (p. 196). The authors assert that judges are
more used to technical evidence and have a greater ability to
sort through that evidence in comparison to the lay juror, and
can appoint a special master to serve as an expert (p. 196). The
authors further argue that there is no good distinction between
mandating that judges should interpret claims and not juries,
but then leave technical decisions concerning novelty and
nonobviousness to juries and not judges (p. 196). The judge
could construe the obviousness and novelty of a patented
invention and leave the ultimate question of obviousness and
novelty to the jury as is essentially done with infringement (pp.
196-97). Judges likely have a higher education level than the
average jury member and thus, may be better suited to
understand the complexities of patent law and the technology
at issue.73 There is little doubt that that would be true for
special masters. This proposal would likely lead to more
predictability in patent litigation, and may reduce the
likelihood that a jury may be swayed by a persuasive theme at
trial surrounding the toils of the inventor.
V. JAFFE AND LERNER’S FINAL THOUGHTS
The authors also address the argument that patent law
should be tailored to specific technologies (p. 198). The authors
offer compelling arguments against such proposals and assert
72. This is contrary to the position proposed by the Federal Trade
Commission. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 18, at 8.
73. Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996)
(holding that claim construction is a question of law to be decided by the judge
and is not subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury will
determine the meaning of claim terms).
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the better solution is to repair the system as a whole,
particularly with software and business methods, where the
prior art is in the hands of industry members and not readily
accessible to patent examiners (pp. 199-200). The authors
review specific innovations such as business methods, and
argue no distinction should be made between inventions
brought forth through the use of science versus a method of
doing business (p. 199). The proper policy question is whether
the patent system is encouraging the development of new
products and processes (pp. 199-200).
Business methods
require the investment of time and money to develop and may
require patent protection to prevent free riding (p. 200). The
problems with the issuance of software patents stems from a
difficulty in allowing claims to issue on innovations that are not
new or nonobvious (p. 200). This problem is not specific to
software (p. 203). Similarly, for biotechnology research tools, if
the tool is novel and nonobvious then the patent should issue
(p. 203). It is not unreasonable to require a royalty in that
situation (p. 203). Finally, the authors argue that differential
treatment between technologies is very difficult to implement
and “there will be an inevitable tendency for people to position
themselves to get the most favorable treatment” (p. 204). The
authors point to current gaming of the patent system made
possible by Congress’s willingness to pass technology-specific
laws such as the inclusion, in President Bush’s domestic
security legislation, of a provision protecting a vaccine made by
a pharmaceutical company (pp. 204-05). This provision became
law notwithstanding the current fact that neither anyone on
Capitol Hill or in the White House is willing to admit inserting
it into a domestic security bill (p. 205). This behavior would
only intensify with presumptions treating technologies
differently (p. 205).
CONCLUSION
Jaffe and Lerner offer a balanced, thoughtful analysis of
the patent system and reform efforts. While recognizing the
importance that certain and strong patent rights provide, the
authors offer proposals which will greatly improve the quality
of patents and provide the necessary certainty that inventors
and investors require to invest time and money in researching
and developing new innovations. Their two tiered approach to
solve the problems of the patent system attacks the current
system at its weakest points: the issuance of weak patent

MIRELES_4-24-05

2005]

7/11/2006 6:45:26 PM

A BALANCED PROPOSAL

735

grants from the USPTO and the liberal upholding of the
validity of weak patents. The implementation of a pre-grant
opposition proceeding, allowing for admission of additional
relevant prior art for consideration by the examiner, would
certainly reduce the issuance of weak patents. Moreover, the
post grant reexamination proceeding would allow for a further
review of weak patents, while preventing abuse of the system
by competitors of the patent holder. Based on this system for
the USPTO, the CAFC’s presumption of validity for issued
patents will carry more meaning. In addition, their second tier
for solving the patent system would have the CAFC rely on
more determinations by a judge rather than a relatively
unsophisticated jury. This will provide truer results in cases
questioning a patent’s validity. The proposed plan’s only
weakness can be found in practical applications of certain
ideas. For example, the “non-trivial” fee for initiating a post
grant reexamination might actually lead to abuse by certain
parties while also preventing genuine claims from being
brought forth. However, by taking into account the goal
intended by reform of the current patent system and the
interests of inventors, businesses, and the Congress, the
authors’ recalibration of the current system would rectify many
of the current patent system’s problems without destabilizing
the very purposes of the system.

